The Supreme Court Just Made International Travel Riskier for Green Card Holders

The Case: Muk Choi Lau

Muk Choi Lau, a 69-year-old Chinese citizen, became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in September 2007. In May 2012, New Jersey authorities charged him with third-degree trademark counterfeiting — specifically, possessing and intending to sell approximately 2,860 pairs of counterfeit shorts, valued at close to $300,000. At that point, Lau had only been charged, not convicted or even tried.

While the charge was pending, Lau traveled briefly to China. When he attempted to reenter the United States at John F. Kennedy International Airport on June 15, 2012, a CBP officer conducted a records check, saw the pending criminal charge, and asked Lau about it. Lau denied committing a crime. The officer had no confession, no conviction, and no finding of guilt — only a pending indictment. Despite this, the officer chose not to admit Lau as a returning lawful permanent resident. Instead, the officer paroled Lau into the United States, physically taking his green card.

1. Sept 2007
   Muk Choi Lau becomes a lawful permanent resident of the United States.
2. May 2012
   New Jersey charges Lau with third-degree trademark counterfeiting. Charge is pending — no conviction, no plea.
3. Jun 15, 2012
   Lau returns to JFK Airport after a brief trip to China. CBP officer sees the pending charge, takes his green card, and paroles him into the country rather than admitting him as a returning LPR.
4. Jun 2013
   Lau pleads guilty to trademark counterfeiting and receives two years' probation.
5. Mar 2014
   DHS begins removal proceedings on inadmissibility grounds — the stricter track made available by the 2012 parole classification.
6. 2018–2021
   Immigration judge and Board of Immigration Appeals uphold the removal order. BIA dismisses Lau's appeal.
7. 2025
   The Second Circuit Court of Appeals sides with Lau, holding that CBP needed "clear and convincing evidence" of a disqualifying crime before treating him as seeking admission. DHS begins removal proceedings.
8. Jun 23, 2026
   The Supreme Court reverses the Second Circuit 6-3, holding the INA imposes no clear-and-convincing-evidence standard on border officers at the time of reentry.

The Legal Framework: Admission vs. Seeking Admission

Understanding Blanche v. Lau requires understanding a fundamental distinction in U.S. immigration law: the difference between being "admitted" as a lawful permanent resident and being treated as someone "seeking admission."

Under INA §101(a)(13)(C), codified at 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(13), a lawful permanent resident returning from a brief, casual, and innocent trip abroad is generally not treated as "seeking an admission." This is the default protective rule — the law recognizes that an LPR who has already been thoroughly vetted and admitted should not have to re-prove their admissibility every time they travel. The statute literally states that a returning LPR "shall not" be regarded as seeking admission.

There are six exceptions to that protective rule — circumstances in which a returning LPR may be treated as seeking admission. The most relevant to this case is exception five: the returning LPR has "committed" a "crime involving moral turpitude." Under the INA, crimes involving moral turpitude are generally dishonest or immoral acts — fraud, theft, counterfeiting, and similar offenses. The question at the heart of Blanche v. Lau was what evidentiary standard a border officer must satisfy before applying that exception at the port of entry.

The reason the answer matters so much is what follows from the classification. A returning LPR who is admitted retains the procedural posture of a lawful permanent resident — if the government later seeks to remove that person, it must charge them as "deportable" and bears the burden of proof. A returning LPR who is instead treated as "seeking admission" enters a fundamentally different legal track: the government pursues removal on "inadmissibility" grounds, under which the individual often bears the burden of proving admissibility rather than the government bearing the burden of proving deportability.

What the Court Held — and Why

Writing for the six-justice conservative majority, Justice Thomas held that the INA simply does not impose a "clear and convincing evidence" standard on border officers at the time of reentry. The majority opinion frames the analysis as straightforward textual interpretation: the statute permits the government to treat an LPR as seeking admission when the LPR has "committed" a qualifying crime, and commission — not conviction — is the statutory trigger.

Thomas rejected two of Lau's core arguments. First, he rejected the claim that the government had conceded in prior proceedings that the clear-and-convincing standard applied, explaining that any such concession was made only in the context of removal hearings, not border encounters. Second, he rejected the argument that an LPR cannot be found to have "committed" a crime until after a conviction, reading the statutory text as permitting the government to regard a person as having committed a crime even when conviction comes later.

The majority declined to read an evidentiary burden into the statute that wasn't there: "We decline to read into the INA an additional clear-and-convincing-evidence burden on border officers entrusted with making 'quick judgments on the spot' when that burden is nowhere in the statute or even Board precedent," Thomas concluded. Critically, the Court did not decide what standard, if any, applies at the border — only that "clear and convincing evidence" is not the floor.

The Dissent: Justice Jackson's Warning

Justice Jackson's 17-page dissent, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, argued that the majority's reading of the statute ignores what Jackson described as a fundamental sequencing problem. The INA's core directive is that a returning LPR "shall not" be treated as seeking admission — that default protection is the rule, and the exceptions require actual evidence at the time of the border encounter, not retroactive justification.

Jackson's dissent centered on a practical concern the majority largely set aside: placement on parole rather than admission is not a costless procedural technicality. When a border officer paroles an LPR rather than admitting them, the physical green card is taken. The person loses reliable documentary proof of their permanent resident status. They face exposure to harsher removal grounds than would apply if they had simply been admitted. Their ability to travel again is constrained. And they may remain in that legal limbo for months or years — in Lau's case, the question of his status was unsettled for over a decade — without any certainty about when or whether the uncertainty will be resolved.

Jackson also raised a concern that extends well beyond the specific facts of Lau's case. She warned that the majority's reasoning is not obviously limited to situations where a criminal charge is pending. If border officers need no defined evidentiary threshold to invoke any of the six exceptions to LPR admission protections, the government's authority at the border over returning permanent residents is significantly broader than most of the country's 12.8 million green card holders have understood it to be.

The Two Tracks: Why the Classification Matters

The practical consequences of being placed on parole versus being admitted as a returning resident are substantial and can be difficult to undo. The distinction is not merely procedural — it determines which legal track the entire subsequent case runs on, and the two tracks differ significantly in burden of proof, available defenses, and grounds for removal.

The immediate practical consequences of the Track 2 classification include: loss of the physical green card at the border, possible detention pending an immigration hearing, loss of the right to further travel pending resolution, and exposure to inadmissibility-based removal grounds rather than the narrower deportability grounds that would apply to an admitted LPR. Even when the government ultimately permits the person to remain in the country on parole while proceedings unfold, that parole status carries none of the legal certainty of admitted permanent residence.

What the Court Left Open

Several significant questions were explicitly not resolved by the majority opinion, and the answers will determine how broadly Blanche v. Lau reshapes the border experience for lawful permanent residents in practice.

• What standard does apply at the border? The Court held that clear and convincing evidence is not required — but said nothing about what threshold border officers must meet. This question will likely generate further litigation and, potentially, agency guidance.
• Does the ruling extend to all six exceptions? Advocacy organizations have flagged that the majority's reasoning could be applied to any of the six exceptions to LPR admission protections — including situations involving travel of more than 180 days or alleged abandonment of LPR status — not just criminal charges. The Court did not address this.
• Is trademark counterfeiting a crime of moral turpitude? The majority vacated the Second Circuit's judgment and remanded — meaning the case goes back to the lower courts, and Lau may still prevail if trademark counterfeiting is found not to qualify as a crime of moral turpitude under the INA.
• Can an LPR challenge an improper parole classification? The Court acknowledged that future cases might flesh out whether, and how, an LPR can challenge a parole determination they believe was made without adequate justification. No mechanism was articulated in the current opinion.

What This Means for Green Card Holders Traveling Internationally

The practical takeaway from Blanche v. Lau is not that every green card holder faces a new risk every time they travel. For LPRs with no criminal history and no pending legal proceedings, the legal landscape at the border has not materially changed. The ruling's direct impact is concentrated on a specific population: LPRs who have any pending criminal matter, any prior arrest or charge, any unresolved legal history, or any prior immigration violation — and who travel internationally before that matter is fully resolved.

For that population, the ruling lowers the threshold at which a CBP officer may reclassify a returning permanent resident as someone seeking admission, with all the procedural and substantive consequences that flow from that reclassification. The decision does not change the grounds for ultimate removal — an LPR can only be removed on the grounds the INA specifies. But it changes the procedural track on which that removal case proceeds, and that track determines burden of proof, available defenses, and the immediate border experience.

• Any pending criminal charge, arrest, or open matter — however minor — should be reviewed with an immigration attorney before international travel
• Prior convictions, even old ones, for offenses that might qualify as crimes of moral turpitude require specific travel advice — some carry border risk that is not obvious from the face of the conviction
• Prior immigration violations, periods of unlawful presence, or any prior removal proceedings in your history warrant pre-travel legal consultation
• Travel outside the United States for more than 180 days triggers a separate INA exception — an issue distinct from the criminal charge exception in this case but potentially subject to the same reduced evidentiary threshold going forward
• If you are reclassified at the border and placed on parole rather than admitted, document everything and contact an immigration attorney as quickly as possible — the procedural posture is significantly harder to correct once it is set

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